ENCLOSURE 2. PHYSICAL SECURITY
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 7 ENCLOSURE 2
PHYSICAL SECURITY
1. GENERAL
a. Physical security standards for the construction and protection of SCIFs are prescribed in Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705 (Reference (f)), Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-1 (Reference (g)), and ICS 705-2 (Reference (h)). DoD SCIFs will be established in accordance with those references and this Volume.
(1) Wherever practical, SCIFs will be designated as a restricted area in accordance with DoD Instruction 5200.08 (Reference (i)). The special security officer (SSO) will coordinate to list the SCIF within the post or installation directive that defines and designates all local restricted areas and will post outside the SCIF the proper English and, when appropriate (overseas areas only), foreign language “Restricted Area” signs. If a SCIF is physically located within a restricted area, it does not also need to be designated as a controlled area.
(2) Personnel who work in or have routine or unescorted access to a SCIF must be indoctrinated for the compartments of SCI that is discussed, processed, or stored within the facility.
(a) If a SCIF has multiple SCI control systems that are physically separated by an internal access control device or other similar control system, only SCI-indoctrinated personnel with the appropriate level of access for the facility will escort uncleared personnel. SCIF door combinations and bypass keys, if applicable, must be protected at the same level for which the facility is accredited.
(b) Main entry point combinations and bypass keys, if applicable, will be stored in a different SCIF of the same or higher accreditation.
(c) Access codes to an intrusion detection system and access control device will be limited to personnel who are SCI-indoctrinated and have a need to know. Administrator privileges to intrusion detection systems should be limited to the SSO.
(3) Operations security (OPSEC) principles are critical for protecting the operational activities and security of SCIFs. OPSEC principles should be considered and implemented based on the local security environment.
(a) The facility’s location (complete address) and identity as a SCIF shall be protected at a minimum of FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). Drawings or diagrams identified as a SCIF may not be posted on an UNCLASSIFIED website or transmitted over the Internet without some type of encryption.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 8 (b) SCIFs should be referred to as a controlled space or another terminology so as not to designate it as a SCIF on releasable documents (e.g., bid requests, permit requests, sub- contractor plans).
(c) Refer to DoDD 5205.2 (Reference (j)) for further OPSEC guidance.
(4) All new facilities shall be constructed as directed in References (g) and (h), and in compliance with Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-1 (Reference (k)). SCIF construction overseas shall also comply with applicable local anti-terrorism and force protection regulations. SCIFs built under Chief of Mission (COM) control will follow Department of State guidelines.
b. Approvals. Reference (f) provides detailed physical security recommendations that should be applied. These recommendations are generally phrased with words such as “should,” “may,” and “can.” In some instances, such as speakerphones, answering machines, and secondary doors, these recommendations are contingent upon accrediting official (AO) (DIA Counterintelligence and Security Office (DAC)) approval. Requests must include adequate details that enable DAC to render an informed decision. DAC may delegate to senior intelligence officials (SIOs) of the Combatant Commands the authority to approve Temporary Secure Working Areas (TSWAs), Temporary SCIFs (T-SCIFs), and concept statements for creation of new SCIFs.
c. Mitigations . Methods identified in the Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specifications contained in Reference (g) are an accepted way to meet the performance standard, but there may be several ways to achieve the same standard other than what is listed. A different method may be used if it achieves the same performance standard as identified in Reference (f). This mitigation must be identified in the Fixed Facility Checklist (Attachment A to Reference (g)) and requires approval from the AO before implementation.
d. Waivers
(1) Reference (f) provides detailed physical security requirements. These requirements are generally phrased with definitive words such as “will,” “shall,” and “must.” Requirements of this nature require a waiver whenever they cannot be followed and mitigations cannot be applied (i.e., a waiver down). A waiver is also required when these standards are exceeded (i.e., a waiver up).
(2) All waiver requests will be submitted through the cognizant security authority (CSA), their designee, or the DoD Component SIO to DAC for review. If DAC determines that a waiver is warranted, it will process the waiver request for approval.
(3) Waivers down will be guided by the principles of risk management. The request must be signed by the reviewing official (the CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO) and at a minimum must include the following information:
(a ) The physical security requirement(s) that cannot be met.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 9 (b) Explanation of why the security requirement cannot be implemented and the mitigations that were considered.
(c ) Mission impact if the waiver is disapproved.
(d) Identification of compensatory countermeasures that can be implemented in lieu of the established physical security requirements that can reduce the residual risk.
(e) The time expectation on when the standard can be met and a waiver is no longer required.
(4) Elements requesting waivers up must forward a written request through the CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO to DAC. The request at a minimum must include the following information:
(a ) The physical security requirement that will be exceeded.
(b) A statement of documented risk that justifies the need to exceed standards.
(c ) Mission impact if the waiver is disapproved.
(d) Identification of the additional security measures being put into place.
(e) The time expectation on when the waiver will no longer be required.
(5) Limitations on Waivers. Waivers are normally granted for a period of up to 1 year or until such time as the waiver is no longer needed. All waivers shall be reported to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and maintained in the ODNI database. All SCIFs with permanent waivers will be reviewed annually using the current standards to determine if a waiver is still needed or if mitigations can be used instead. Elements requesting co-use of any SCIF with a waiver will be informed of it.
(6) Classification Guidance. Guidance on classification of information related to the accreditation of DoD SCIFs is maintained on the DAC JWICS website (http://www.dia.ic.gov/homepage/da/security/field/index.html). All SCIF documentation classified under DIA classification authority shall be marked and transmitted per DoDM 5200.01 (Reference (l)).
2. SCIF DESIGN AND PLANNING
a. Site Planning
(1) SCIF security begins with the decision to build a SCIF. Adequate planning and design will prevent many of the security risks to SCI and reduce the costs of construction. Site planning should include looking at the standoff distances for AT/FP as well as TEMPEST.
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(2) The Service CSA or DoD Component SIO or their designees shall conduct one-time construction project reviews before site acquisition (purchase or lease of a building) for the purpose of making transparent, accountable, and prudent risk management decisions involving security requirements and long-term security risks.
b. Concept Approval
(1) The concept approval is the first critical element in the establishment of a SCIF. Concept approval certifies that a clear operational requirement exists for the SCIF and there is no existing SCIF to support the requirement.
(2) Once a need for SCI has been identified, the organization’s commander will submit a request for SCI to the Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs. This request will identify the levels and types of SCI desired and certify that the organization is able to support the SCIF (i.e., manning and budget) throughout its lifecycle.
(3) Upon receipt of the request to build a SCIF, the Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs will validate the need for a SCIF and the requirement for the requested level of SCI. The Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs are required to grant concept approval to establish a SCIF, to include contractor SCIFs. They may delegate this approval as deemed necessary. If delegated, the Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs must notify DAC to preclude potential confusion.
(4) The Service CSAs, their designees , or DoD Component SIOs will provide the concept approval and, if applicable, the DD Form 254, “Contract Security Classification Specification,” for contractor facilities to DAC with an information copy to the supporting SSO.
c. Diplomatic Facilities
(1) DoD SCIFs established within diplomatic facilities fall under the security responsibility of the COM and must also obtain permission through Department of State channels to build a SCIF. These SCIFs will comply with all requirements of Reference (f) and meet the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards in accordance with Volume 6 of U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Handbook 12 (Reference (m)).
(2) Where OSPB standards and DoD standards conflict, the more stringent will be applied unless resolved by DAC and the Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
3. SCIF TYPES
a. Temporary SCIFs
(1) TSWA
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 11 (a) A TSWA must not be used more than 40 hours per month and no longer than 12 months in the same location. The 40-hour rule is based on an average use of the TSWA over a 12-month period. The purpose for this requirement is that a TSWA’s physical security standards are less than that of a permanently accredited SCIF. If the facility will be used on a more frequent basis, the user of a facility must pursue permanent accreditation. On a case-by-case basis and with sufficient justification, DAC may approve SCI storage (not to exceed 6 months).
(b) The Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs may approve TSWAs for all compartments of SCI. Approval for processing SCI in TSWAs may only be granted by DIA or heads of the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Military Services, Combatant Commands, and Defense Agencies according to their respective information system (IS) accreditation authority.
(c) Active TSWA status will be annotated on the DIA JWICs share point site by the applicable Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs.
(2) T-SCIF
(a ) T-SCIFs are used in support of tactical, contingency, and field-training operations for a limited time where physical security construction standards associated with permanent facilities are not possible. They may include hardened structures (buildings, bunkers, etc.), truck-mounted or towed military shelters, tents, prefabricated modular trailers or buildings, and areas used on aircraft and surface and subsurface vessels.
(b) The Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs may establish and grant temporary accreditation to operate a T-SCIF. These officials may further delegate this approval, in writing, to a lower level of command providing continued oversight is maintained. No further delegation is authorized. T-SCIF approvals will be valid for up to 1 year. Consideration must be given to establishing a permanent SCIF whenever it is known that the T- SCIF will be required for a period greater than 1 year. Extension beyond the 1-year period must be justified in writing to DAC, which retains approval authority.
(c ) Active T-SCIF status will be annotated on the DIA JWICs sharepoint site by the applicable Service CSAs, their designees, or DoD Component SIOs.
(d) Elements establishing or operating a T -SCIF within a deployed theater will notify the respective Combatant Command SSO within 48 hours. Such elements will also provide updates relating to the current location and status of T-SCIF under their control as directed by the Combatant Command SSO.
(e ) Refer to Chapter 5, “IC Technical Specifications,” of Reference (f) for detailed physical security requirements for T-SCIFs. DAC is the approving authority whenever the application of a specific physical security requirement cannot be achieved in response to an unprecedented or unique operating environment.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 12 (f ) The information assurance manager (IAM) must obtain Automated Information System (AIS) accreditations in accordance with Reference (f). The designated approval authority (DAA) shall decide whether to grant accreditation approval to operate a system based on all available documentation and mitigating factors. The DAA may grant approval to operate a system as certified or grant interim approval to operate identifying the steps and any additional controls to be completed prior to full accreditation.
(g) The T -SCIF accrediting authority is responsible for ensuring that the TEMPEST requirements for the T-SCIF are followed. These requirements are outlined in Enclosure 4 of this Volume of this Manual. If these requirements cannot be met, DIA’s Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) must be consulted.
b. Permanent SCIF . DAC is the sole accrediting authority for physical and technical (TEMPEST) security for permanent SCI facilities.
(1) Secure Working Areas (SWAs). SWAs are accredited and used for handling, discussing, and processing but SCI is not stored in them. Since there is no time limit on their accreditation, SWAs require a higher level of security than TSWAs and T-SCIFs. The SWA shall be controlled at all times by SCI indoctrinated individuals or secured with a General Services Administration (GSA)-approved pedestrian deadbolt meeting Federal specification FF- L-2890. All SCI used in a SWA shall be moved to an accredited SCIF at the end of each business day or destroyed using CSA approved methods. There shall be a plan to relocate or destroy SCI material in the event of an emergency or natural disaster. This plan shall be tested semi-annually.
(2) Continuous Operations SCIFs. This SCIF is staffed and operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Staffed refers to personnel who possess the appropriate security clearance and are permanently assigned to the SCIF as opposed to the guard force. There should be enough personnel continuously present to observe all areas that provide access to the SCIF to include primary, secondary, and emergency exit doors.
(3) Open Storage SCIFs. Open storage SCIFs allow SCI to be openly stored within the SCIF without using GSA-approved storage containers. Open storage construction requirements shall be met.
(4) Closed Storage SCIFs. All SCI material must be stored in a GSA-approved security container in an accredited facility.
4. CONSTRUCTION SECURITY
a . The renovation of existing SCIFs and the construction of new SCIFs shall meet the security requirements outlined in Reference (f). Any variances of these requirements must be approved by DAC prior to their implementation.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 13 b. An SCI -indoctrinated site security manager (SSM) shall be designated by the component SSO for each new construction or renovation project. The SSM may be a U.S. Government (USG) employee, military member, or contractor, but will not be employed by the construction firm completing the project. The SSM represents the organization constructing or renovating the SCIF for all security matters to both the construction firm and the AO.
(1) The SSM shall develop a construction security plan (CSP) for each project. The plan shall include a risk assessment of the threats against the project to include human intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelligence (CI), technical, and AT/FP. The threat sources identified in Reference (f) must be used, but additional threat assessments from local sources should be utilized to define the total threat.
(2) The complexity and scope of the CSP will depend on the project. Simple modifications may only be a few pages, while the construction of a new building may be several hundred pages. Project work schedule and related documents shall be provided to the SSM in order to adequately consider and implement prudent or required security measures.
(3) The SSM, during the course of the project, shall establish appropriate security files. These files may include work schedules, picture ID cards and access records, local guard incident and other reports, inspection reports, copies of security violations, and similar substantive project documentation as deemed appropriate by the SSM.
(4) SSMs shall have 24-hour unrestricted access to on-site construction offices and areas to conduct security inspections. This does not mean that the SSM has to be on site at all times. During construction or renovations, the SSM shall conduct unannounced security surveys at random intervals to meet appropriate security procedures.
(5) The SSM shall be responsible for access control of the site and verify that the construction site is clear of all uncleared workers during non-duty hours.
c. During the design phase and prior to the start of construction, a CSP shall be developed by the SSM. A CSP template is available on the DIA SCIF JWICS accreditation site (http://www.dia.ic.gov/homepage/da/security/field/index.html).
(1) Security officials overseeing SCIF construction projects shall submit the CSP to DAC at the 30 percent design point along with the completed risk assessment. Based on these two documents, DAC will issue CSP guidance. The SSM will continue to update the CSP as appropriate and develop SOPs for use on the project. Component SSOs will monitor the development and implementation of the CSP. TEMPEST requirements will also be identified during this time in accordance with Enclosure 4 of this Volume.
(2) A facility under the COM, the CSP must be confirmed or certified in accordance with the OSPB in accordance with Reference (m). Assistance in developing a CSP can be obtained through DAC or the local Department of State representative.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 14 d. SCI -indoctrinated escorts are required when uncleared workers have access to SCIF areas. The ratio of escorts will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the SSM. Prior to assuming escort duties, escorts shall receive a briefing outlining their individual responsibilities.
e. Security checks will be performed on construction personnel to the greatest extent practical. Security checks shall, at a minimum, consist of local records checks conducted by military installation visitor and pass and identification offices, local military police, or local CI offices.
(1) Access to the construction site shall be denied or withdrawn by the SSM if any security checks reveal a felony criminal record, or the risk is otherwise too great to permit access to the site. SSM shall notify the installation or corporate access control department to ensure the individual cannot gain further access.
(2) A list of authorized workers should be established and maintained by the SSM.
(3) Prior to obtaining access to the site, construction workers shall be given an unclassified security orientation by a security representative. A security POC shall be provided for construction personnel to report information of a security nature.
f. A unique project site picture ID card and temporary pass system shal l be implemented for access control.
(1) Construction site access control must include effective entry and exit screening and search procedures. To the greatest extent possible, a single entry point should be established to aid in this process.
(2) A prominent sign, printed in English and, if applicable, any other language deemed appropriate, shall list all prohibited and restricted items, and shall be posted at all construction area entry points. Personal bags, parcels, or packages shall not be allowed on the construction site by uncleared workers unless procedures are established for searching and safekeeping of such items.
(3) Physical security barriers shall be erected to deny unauthorized access to the controlled areas.
5. SCIF ACCREDITATION
a. The DAC is the a ccrediting official for DoD SCI facilities, excluding those under NGA, NRO, and NSA cognizance.
b. Refer to Enclosure 4 of this Volume for TEMPEST accreditation and ICD 503 (Reference (n)) for AIS accreditation.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 15 c. The physical accreditation process begins when the DAC AO receives a validated concept approval from a Service CSA or DoD Component SIO or their designee.
d. Upon receipt of the concept approval , DAC will assign a SCIF ID in order to track future correspondence and forward this to the requestor through their chain. The requestor shall appoint an SSM, complete the CSP (see section 4 of this enclosure) and TEMPEST Countermeasures Review worksheet (see Enclosure 4 of this Volume) and begin the fixed facility checklist (FFC). The FFC format is in the technical specifications published under Reference (f).
e. Preconstruction Approval
(1) The SCIF design will consider threats and vulnerabilities against appropriate security measures to reach an acceptable level of risk. Proper security planning for a SCIF is intended to deny foreign intelligence services and other unauthorized personnel the opportunity for undetected entry into these facilities and exploitation of sensitive activities.
(2) Upon receipt of the concept approval and checklists, DAC will conduct a comprehensive risk management review and provide preconstruction advice and assistance. To avoid costly construction pitfalls, no construction should begin until DAC has reviewed the packet.
(3) The FFC included in technical specifications published in accordance with Reference (g) and the Aircraft/UAV Accreditation Checklist and Shipboard (Surface/Subsurface) Accreditation Checklist are the primary documents in the decision-making process for granting a final accreditation. These checklists must provide sufficient detail to enable DAC to determine if the facilities satisfy physical standards detailed in Reference (g). Shipboard and aircraft accreditation checklists are available through the JWICS website at http://www.dia.ic.gov/homepage/da/security/field/index.html.
(4) These documents, along with their enclosures, should be completed and submitted initially around the end of the design phase when sufficient information has been gathered to complete the majority of the FFC. They should be updated periodically during the construction phase. The fully complete FFC and TEMPEST Addendum, along with attachments, should be submitted prior to the completion of the SCIF for the final accreditation.
f. Accreditation. Acceptance of the accreditation package is the last step in obtaining the accreditation of a new SCIF or the reaccreditation of an existing SCIF. The SCI security official will submit one copy each of the accreditation package to DAC through the appropriate CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO.
(1) The accreditation package must include:
(a) The final FFC.
(b) Specification sheets for IDS component parts.
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(c) UL 2050 certification for IDS (this requirement does not apply to SCIFs on military installations).
(d) NIST 128 bit certificate for IDS.
(e) IDS test results.
(f) SAP co-utilization agreement (if applicable).
(g) Technical surveillance countermeasure (TSCM) reports (if applicable).
(h) Catastrophic failure plan.
(2) All entries on the changed or “to be determined” items list must be completed and an asterisk placed to the left of each paragraph that changed from the initial FFC.
(3) DAC will review the accreditation package for compliance with SCI physical security standards and will issue a formal written accreditation for the SCIF and notify the requesting SSO and the appropriate CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO once the SCIF satisfactorily meets the standards. In some instances, a pre-accreditation inspection by DIA SCIF accreditors may be required. The SCIF identification number initially assigned by DAC in the preconstruction phase must be used on all future communications with DIA/DAC-2. SCI will not be discussed or introduced into the proposed SCIF until the facility is accredited. The SCI compartments will not be included in the DAC formal written accreditation document.
(4) Accreditation documents transmitted to DAC, to the greatest extent practical, should be in a digital format.
g. Transfer of Security Cognizance. SCIFs transferred from one CSA to another are not required to be reaccredited provided that all the physical security standards remain in place, all accreditation records will be furnished to the new CSA, and all appropriate organizations will be notified. Whenever DIA assumes CSA responsibility, DAC will issue a temporary accreditation with a new SCIF identification number and request that all accreditation documents be updated and submitted to DAC within 90 days. A permanent accreditation will then be issued.
h. Reaccreditation . An existing SCIF must be reaccredited when a change occurs in any of the following areas: SCIF perimeter (i.e., expansion or downsizing), storage requirements (i.e., closed storage to open storage), change from continuous (24 hours) operations to open or closed storage. Furthermore, a reaccreditation may be issued based upon results from a DIA inspection. Reaccreditation is not required whenever a compartment of SCI is moved from one room to another within the SCIF.
i. Modifications
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 17 (1) All modifications involving construction work on the perimeter walls or major modifications must have a CSP (see section 4 of this enclosure).
(2) Major modifications to existing SCIFs require prior approval by DAC. These modifications include, but are not limited to, acquisition and installation of new alarm, telephone and intercom systems, changes in exterior doors, windows and locking devices, vent and duct work, and changes in security posture (e.g., closed vice open storage, continuous operations vice closed).
(3) Minor modifications to existing SCIFs require DAC notification. These modifications include, but are not limited to permanent securing of doors, installation of approved phones, changes in occupant or office symbol, room numbers, and interior changes.
(4) For either modification, submit an updated page change of the FFC with applicable drawings. Each page must be fully completed and dated, and an asterisk must be placed beside the changed items. DAC will review the completed FFC for compliance and give a formal reply prior to the modification occurring. For major modifications, the facility may be inspected prior to reaccreditation.
j. Changes to Security Posture. Within 24 hours, the SSO will report to DAC and the appropriate CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO, through SSO chain of command, all changes affecting the security posture of any SCIF. If immediate advice is required, call DAC (703-907-1299 or DSN 283-1299). Examples of changes in security posture include:
(1) Fire, explosion, natural, or other disaster.
(2) Any other situation affecting SCI security.
k. Withdrawal of Accreditation
(1) When a SCIF is no longer required, the local SSO will initiate withdrawal of accreditation and forward a copy of the request to the appropriate head of an intelligence community element (HICE) or designee. Upon notification, DAC will issue appropriate SCI withdrawal correspondence. The SCIF identification number will no longer be valid. The local SCI security official responsible for SCIF security will conduct a closeout inspection of the facility to verify that all SCI material has been removed. Use the guidelines in Appendix 1 to this enclosure.
(2) If DAC determines there is a danger of compromising classified information or security conditions in a SCIF are unsatisfactory, SCI accreditation will be suspended or revoked. All appropriate authorities will be notified of such action immediately.
(a ) DAC may approve reaccreditation of a previously accredited SCIF based upon a review of an updated facility accreditation package.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 18 (b) Contractor SCIF accreditation will terminate with the termination of the contract(s) and the time allotted for contract closeout. The contractor SSO (CSSO) will initiate the SCIF closeout and the contracting officer representative (COR) will verify that all SCI material is removed from the SCIF and disposed of according to the contract vehicle and all applicable policy documents. The CSSO will follow guidance in Appendix 1 of this enclosure.
l. Caretaker Status. Caretaker status occurs when a SCIF owner or sponsor identifies a need to temporarily shut down SCI activities. This change in accreditation status, granted by DIA/DAC-2, is usually associated with, but not limited to, major construction projects or operational contingencies requiring the local SCI mission to forward deploy. The SCIF owner or sponsor anticipates resuming normal operations in the future. Once approved for caretaker status, the SCIF has up to 1 year to obtain a reaccreditation and be authorized to resume normal SCI operations. The SCIF owner must provide an estimated activation date when requesting caretaker status. Extensions may be granted on a case-by-case basis by DAC. However, extension requests must specify, in writing, the adjusted estimated activation timeframe.
(1) To implement this change in status, the local SSO must submit a caretaker status request to DAC for review and approval; with a copy forwarded to the HICE or designee. Upon notification, DAC will issue the appropriate caretaker status correspondence. Once approved, the local SSO must verify all SCI material and systems were completely removed from the SCIF. If any other classified materials are to remain, that information must still be protected in accordance with the applicable policy and regulations. At a minimum, the area under caretaker status should be controlled to limit access to authorized personnel only. These controls may include, but are not limited to, key-lock devices, alarms systems, escorts, and construction surveillance technicians.
(2) Reinstituting a facility’s SCI accreditation can be accomplished by the SSO submitting an updated FFC or official correspondence requesting reaccreditation to DAC. If no requests for accreditation are made or if the requests are not received within the authorized timeframe, DAC will automatically disestablish caretaker status and withdraw the SCIF identification number.
6. SCIF OPERATIONS
a. Co -utilization of SCIFs
(1) Co-utilization of existing facilities promotes efficiency and achieves financial savings. Elements desiring to co-use a SCIF will accept the current accreditation and any waivers. A co-utilization agreement (CUA) will be established prior to occupancy and any differences shall be resolved prior to its acceptance.
(2) The CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO may coordinate and approve CUAs with other DoD Components (excluding NRO, NGA, and NSA), to include their SCI- related SAPs. In these instances, courtesy copies of the CUAs will be furnished to DAC.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 19 (3) DAC will coordinate CUAs on behalf of DIA with non DoD IC agencies, NRO, NGA, and NSA, to include their respective SCI-related SAPs. In these instances, the CUA will be processed by DAC.
(4) The CSA for the SCIF maintains oversight of the facility unless all parties agree to transfer CSA responsibility. If a transfer occurs, all accreditation records will be furnished to the new CSA and all appropriate organizations will be notified. The gaining CSA will issue a new accreditation or provide written confirmation of the transfer of the facility.
(5) Planned modifications, to include additions of IS or electronic processing equipment, must be approved by the CSA in advance. Before using this equipment for SCI, appropriate accreditations (i.e., TEMPEST and IS) must be obtained from authorized IS accreditation and TEMPEST technical authorities.
b. SAPs Within DIA-accredited SCIFs
(1) Facilities housing SCI-related SAPs shall meet the physical security requirements of Reference (g). Any physical security measures above those described in Reference (f) required by SAP managers should be negotiated between the SSO and SAP security personnel.
(2) If only part of the SCIF will be used for the SAP, it will be treated as a compartmented area in accordance with Reference (f) and a CUA must be established prior to the introduction of a SAP (SCI or non-SCI) into the SCIF. Copies of the CUA will be provided to each signatory and DAC. A CUA for a SAP that occupies several SCIFs will be negotiated between the overall SAP manager and the CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO. The CUA will contain a provision allowing it to be appended by the local SSO and SAP security officer to meet local security conditions.
(3) If the entire SCIF will be used for the SAP, then the SAP program manager will ensure that an individual read on to the SAP is appointed as the SSR and the appointment provided to the SSO as described in Volume 1 of this Manual. The SSO will be responsible for ensuring that SCI is properly protected and for managing the SCIF. The SAP security officer can be the SCIF security officer as long as he or she has SCI and SAP access. The SSR will conduct a self-inspection of their organization’s security program and report to the CSA SSO.
(4) If non-SCI SAP material must be stored in a SCIF, a CUA with the SCIF will be completed and include the following requirements:
(a) SAP personnel must meet the eligibility standards for the SAP in accordance with DoDD 5205.07 (Reference (o)) and DoDI 5205.11 (Reference (p)).
(b) SAP personnel must receive a security briefing regarding protection of the SCI information while in the SCIF.
(c) Non -SCI indoctrinated personnel will be readily identifiable and will be escorted by SCI-indoctrinated personnel while in the SCIF. If access by non-SCI indoctrinated personnel
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 20 is required for longer periods of time (e.g., daily), consideration will be given to indoctrinating the individual to SCI.
(5) SCI-SAP materials shall be controlled as SCI and SAP jointly. With the exception of physical security standards, when security standards in this Manual and Reference (p) differ, the more stringent administrative security standard shall be applied. Reference (f) shall regulate physical security standards.
(6) The CSA, his or her designee, or the DoD Component SIO may coordinate and approve, with other DoD Components (excluding NRO, NGA, and NSA), the introduction of DoD SAPs into their respective SCIFs. DIA will coordinate joint authorization with the respective DoD SAPCO for any introduction of SAPs with SCI content from non-DoD IC agencies into a DoD SCIF. The DoD SAPCO will coordinate with the non-DoD agency SIO, their designee, and DIA (if accessed) in approving any introduction of DoD SAPs with SCI content into a non-DoD IC agency SCIF.
(7) The SSO for the SCIF and the SAP manager must maintain open communications. The SSO is responsible and accountable to the SIO for the management of the entire SCIF, while the SAP manager is responsible for administration of the SAP. The SSO can enter into the SAP compartmented area of the SCIF to verify physical, technical, TEMPEST, and other security conditions that may affect the integrity of the SCIF. However, to the extent practicable under the circumstances, the SSO should provide advance notice to the SAP manager so that SAP-related materials or operations may be secured in accordance with Reference (o).
c. Photography W ithin a SCIF
(1) The SSO may approve unclassified photography inside a SCIF. The area must be cleared of visible classified information prior to the photography and the SSO or SSR must monitor all photography and prevent the inadvertent photography of classified information.
(2) The SSO shall ensure photographic equipment used within the SCIF complies with local portable electronic devices policy.
d. End -of-day Procedures. The SSO must establish a system of written end-of-day security checks to properly protect all classified materials and to ensure that the SCIF is secured. Use standard form (SF) 701, “Activity Security Checklist,” to record internal security checks at the end of each day that the facility is occupied. Use SF 702, “Security Container Check Sheet,” to record the security checks of the SCIF door, vaults, and containers. This form will document openings, closings, and end-of-day checks, to include those occurring after normal duty hours, weekends, and holidays if the facility is supported by non-duty hour checks conducted by a local guard force. If the SCIF is located in a commercial office building or other location where there is unrestricted public access to the main entry door, do not place the SF 702 on the outer door; instead, place it on the inside of the SCIF. Retain both completed forms for 90 days or as required for investigative purposes. A list of items to be checked at end-of-day is included in Appendix 2 of this Enclosure.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 21 e. After -duty-hours Inspections. Unannounced after-duty-hours security inspections are aimed at heightening the overall security posture for an organization by determining if classified materials are properly protected.
(1) Written procedures must be established, and employees must be briefed to SCI, regardless of the size of the SCIF, amount of personnel working within, or location. Procedures shall be tailored to what is or is not possible and practical for the location. Written procedures should be reviewed by the supporting legal office and be endorsed by the respective CSA, their designee, or the DoD Component SIO prior to implementation.
(2) SSO, SSR, or properly SCI-indoctrinated designees will conduct random inspections at least monthly and annotate the inspection for the record. Whenever possible, they should coordinate with the site IAM if time permits.
(3) Security inspections should include computers, magnetic media, multi- media, security containers, desks, file cabinets, bookcases, and other personal items such as personnel carrying briefcases and packages. Inspections within SAP compartmented areas must not occur without appropriate coordination with the SAP CSA, oversight authority, or program manager in accordance with the governing CUA.
(4) Document the results of the security inspection reports and retain for 6 months. Notify the appropriate SCI chain of command and DIA immediately of any SCI-related security violations. After hours inspection reports may be reviewed by a DAC inspector upon request.
f. Emergency Action Plans (EAPs)
(1) General
(a ) Each SCIF will establish and maintain an EAP that addresses long and short term situations. Emergency plans will vary in scope and procedures, depending on the SCIF’s geographic location and threat. A sample format for EAPs for SCIFs located within the United States is included in Appendix 3 of this enclosure.
(b ) Plans should include task cards so that all areas are covered and coordinated. In addition, all assigned or attached personnel will become familiar with destructive devices employed or maintained for such plans.
(c ) EAPs involving SCI will be coordinated with or incorporated into the host command’s emergency plans. This coordination will provide for the effective and secure evacuation, storage, or destruction in the event of an emergency. Total destruction of priority one material is more desirable than partial destruction of several items.
(d) EAPs will be practiced annually and updated when a change in condition renders a portion of the EAP impossible, infeasible, or unduly burdensome. All personnel must be familiar with the plans and their part in them as either a primary or alternate duty. The SIO or SSO’s
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 22 annual review must be documented. For contractor SCIFs, the COR or designee of the USG organization who has the contract will validate the EAP.
(e ) The SSO, SSR, or CSSR must alert their command SSO and DAC whenever the EAP is activated.
(f ) All materials will be identified for emergency destruction or removal by labeling. Labeling can be accomplished by any matter as long as it provides a clear visual means of destruction priority and is consistent throughout the SCIF. Labels should not identify the priority levels (i.e., do not label the security container “Destruction Priority One”), but rather use something generic such as a shape or icon. Priority levels include:
1. Priority One . All cryptographic equipment and related documents.
2. Priority Two . All operational SCI or SAP codeword material and multi-media that might divulge targets and successes, documents dealing with U.S. SCI activities, and documents concerning compartmented projects and other sensitive intelligence materials and TOP SECRET collateral.
3. Priority Three . Less sensitive administrative SCI material and collateral classified material.
(2) Requirements for all EAPs. EAPs will account for fire, natural disaster (e.g., floods, hurricanes, tornados), labor strife, intrusion detection system (IDS) or alarm outage, entry of emergency personnel (e.g., host country police and firemen) into the SCIF, and the physical protection and safety of those working in such SCIFs. Planning should address the adequacy and condition of components necessary to the plan succeeding such as:
(a ) Location of fire-fighting equipment.
(b ) Assignment of specific responsibilities by duty position, rather than by name, with alternates designated.
(c) Authorization for the senior individual present to implement the plan.
(d ) Periodic review of assigned duties by all personnel.
(e ) Location of SCI material by storage container.
(f ) Location of safe combinations.
(g ) Procedures for admitting uncleared emergency personnel into the SCIF and provisions for safeguarding SCI material during such access.
(h ) Removal of SCI document accounting records to facilitate the post-emergency inventory.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 23
(i ) Emergency evacuation procedures for equipment, material, and personnel, as appropriate.
(j ) Emergency storage procedures, if appropriate.
(k ) Provisions for precautionary and complete destruction, if appropriate.
(l ) Designation of evacuation site and alternate site.
(m ) Designation of primary and alternate travel routes.
(n ) Provision of packing, loading, transporting, and safeguarding SCI material.
(3) SCIFs Located Outside the United States. In areas where political instability, terrorism, host country environment, or criminal activity suggests the possibility that a SCIF might be overrun by hostile forces, EAPs will provide for the secure destruction or removal of SCI under adverse circumstances, such as loss of electrical power, non-availability of open spaces for burning or chemical decomposition of material, and immediate action to be taken if faced with mob attack. Where the risk of overrun is significant, SCI holdings will be reduced to, and kept at, the minimum needed for current working purposes. In addition to subparagraph 5.f.(2) of this enclosure, the following will be considered:
(a ) Location of destruction equipment.
(b ) Periodic checks of all incendiary devices.
(c ) Minimum retention of SCI material.
(d ) Close coordination with, or incorporation into, host command’s emergency contingencies.
(4) Precautionary Actions
(a ) When a possible emergency is anticipated, action must be taken to reduce SCI holding to the minimum necessary to continue operations. This action will facilitate initiation of the EAP should it become necessary. Precautionary actions could take the same form as emergency actions. The SIO, in coordination with the SSO, determines the material that will be retained to continue effective operations and when to store, remove, or destroy material not required.
( b) If material is destroyed as a precautionary measure, the appropriate issuing office must be advised. This office then can replace the material destroyed when the danger period has passed.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 24 (5) Initiation of Plan. Measures that may be taken in the event of an emergency include evacuation, secure storage, and destruction. For SCIFs located in the United States, evacuation or secure storage shall be considered before destruction.
(a ) Evacuation
1. Evacuation will be executed in a systematic manner under the direction of a responsible individual. Every effort will be made to prevent loss or unauthorized access to SCI until the return of the material to its original location or the SCI material is relocated to an alternate SCIF. Factors that may influence the decision to evacuate the SCIF include:
a. Time available.
b. Future requirement for the SCI material.
c. Degree of hazard involved in the removal.
d. Safety of the new location.
e. Means of transportation available.
f. Transportation routes available.
2. When implementation of emergency plans results in abandonment of SCI material, the commander or SIO will make every reasonable effort to recover the material as soon as possible. Recovery will be based on the likelihood of success without subjecting personnel to undue danger. SCI or residue will be collected and placed under the control of SCI-indoctrinated individuals until disposition instructions are received.
(b ) Secure Storage. Secure storage consists of securing the SCI material in other SCIFs or safes before evacuating the area. Presence of a guard does not satisfy secure storage requirements; however, placement of guards by stored material is required when possible. Secure storage is not an effective emergency measure overseas in areas under the threat of enemy or terrorist attack. Factors that may influence the decision to secure the SCI area include:
1. Time available.
2. Nature of the emergency (whether by human or natural causes).
3. Seriousness of the emergency.
4. Likelihood of returning to the site.
5 . Bulk or weight of the material (in deciding whether to store or evacuate).
(c ) Destruction
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 25
1. Selection of an adequate destruction method should be based on a comprehensive evaluation of conditions at a specific SCIF. Destruction of SCI equipment should be by one of the following means:
a. Acetylene torches.
b. Incendiaries.
c. Although not as effective, destruction or disassembling, smashing, or scattering components may be accomplished when incendiaries or acetylene torches are not available. Equipment also may be jettisoned into water deep enough to minimize the possibility of salvage.
2. Documents and other flammable material may be destroyed by burning. Kerosene, gasoline, and sodium nitrate are effective means of destroying documents. They should be used with extreme care for personal safety. Documents also may be destroyed by:
a. Pulverizing.
b. Pulping.
c. Enclosing in a weighted, perforated bag, and jettisoning into water deep enough to minimize the possibility of recovery.
(d) Emergency Destruction. Emergency destruction is authorized if a craft containing SCI material or equipment is wrecked or stranded in unfriendly territory, in neutral territory where capture appears imminent, and under any other circumstances when it appears unlikely that the information can be properly safeguarded. SCI material should be shredded or burned as completely as possible and dispersed. SCI equipment should be smashed or burned beyond repair and dispersed.
(6) After-Action Report. The following actions are required after initiation of EAPs:
(a) The SIO will submit a written report as soon as possible to the next higher headquarters, with an information copy to the HICE or designee and DAC. If the action involved an SCI incident, requirements of Enclosure 5 of Volume 3 of this Manual apply.
(b) Reports will, at a minimum, indicate:
1. Material destroyed and method used.
2. Circumstances that caused the plan to be implemented.
g. Off- site Conferences. Conferences, training courses, meetings, or other such gatherings where SCI is presented, disseminated, or discussed is strictly limited to accredited USG or USG-
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 26 cleared contractor SCIFs. Classified conferences and similar meetings, at any level, will not be held at hotels or other commercial facilities without Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security approval.
h. Destruction . Destroy SCI in a manner that prevents reconstruction. Approved methods include burning, disintegrating, crosscut shredding or pulping for paper, and burning, disintegrating, and chemical alteration for non-paper.
(1) Crosscut shredders contained on the NSA Evaluated Products List for High Security Crosscut Paper Shredders (EPL 02-01) for the terminal destruction of communications security (COMSEC) paper products may be used for the destruction of SCI. This list may be obtained from the NSA National Information Assurance Service Center at 1-800-688-6115 (select option 3) or via DSN at 238-4399.
(2) SCIF personnel may continue to use previous NSA-approved shredders for the destruction of classified information, excluding COMSEC material. However, these devices must be discontinued when the cutting heads require replacement. Budget plans for the procurement of a new shredder, conforming to the new standard, should be considered prior to the replacement need.
(3) There is no special requirement for marking shredders with the highest level of classified information they are authorized to destroy.
i. Foreign National SCIF A ccess. This section prescribes essential safeguards relating to the integration or visit of foreign nationals to include foreign exchange officers, foreign liaison officers, or embedded foreign officers within DIA accredited SCIFs. Any deviations must be addressed with the responsible foreign disclosure officer (FDO), the supporting CI element and be approved by the respective HICE or their designee. If information systems are involved, the DAA for the particular network must give their approval.
(1) Non-SCI-indoctrinated Foreign Nationals. Foreign nationals without appropriate SCI indoctrinations shall not be admitted inside a SCIF unless special approval is obtained in advance by the HICE or designee.
(2) Disclosures to SCI -indoctrinated Foreign Nationals. SCI-indoctrinated foreign nationals may be granted access to a SCIF either as a visitor or an embedded part of the organization per agreement between their government and the USG. However, SCIF access does not constitute approval to release or allow access to any SCI material to a foreign national. Release of SCI materials to foreign nationals must be approved by the responsible FDO in accordance with Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/7 (Reference (q)). Foreign nationals with SCI access are only authorized access to information releasable to their country at the level to which they are granted access.
(3) SCIF Access by SCI -indoctrinated Foreign Nationals. Whenever SCI-indoctrinated foreign nationals are provided general access to a SCIF as part of their official daily duties, the organization will ensure that compensatory security measures aimed at protecting against the
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 27 inadvertent or deliberate release of non-releasable information, both foreign government and USG, is taken and foreign disclosure guidelines must be followed. These measures shall be guided by a risk assessment which weighs the benefit to the USG of foreign national personnel in the SCIF against the risk that security measures will not adequately protect against unauthorized disclosure. Results from this risk assessment shall be provided to DAC for review. A risk assessment for each visit is not required provided one has been done for visits as a whole. The servicing SSO will certify the foreign national’s SCI accesses and the following procedures are applied.
(a ) Areas within the SCIF will be segregated to the greatest extent practical to minimize the likelihood that foreign nationals are inadvertently exposed to non-releasable information. At no time will they be afforded access to areas where IC information and systems, which are not previously approved for disclosure, are located. Such areas will be protected with adequate physical security devices consistent with IC directives.
(b) Foreign nationals shall not be permitted to escort personnel.
(c) A sufficient amount of U.S. SCI-indoctrinated personnel who can properly monitor the safeguards put into place will be present whenever the foreign nationals are present. Automated or non-automated access control devices should be installed in internal SCIF areas where processing, discussion, and storage of U.S.-only information, material, or systems occur as a layer of internal security. However, such devices cannot be used in lieu of the requirement for sufficient U.S. SCI-indoctrinated personnel.
(d) Unique security procedures must be developed and clearly documented in the local standard operating procedure (SOP). Each U.S. SCI-indoctrinated person working within the SCIF must be briefed annually on the SOP and its contents as part of the Security Awareness Training Program. This program will also include CI training to include the indicators of espionage and insider threat.
(e) Foreign nationals will not be provided access to combinations to the SCIF entrance and exit doors or security containers that contain non-releasable information, and codes or functions associated with the SCIFs IDS or master codes associated with automated access control devices.
(f) U.S. SCI-indoctrinated personnel working within the SCIF must be periodically reminded to consistently exercise caution to protect against the inadvertent release of non- releasable information and to promptly report security concerns and issues. Discussions (person to person, secure telephones, video teleconference (VTC), etc.) offer a great challenge when internal rooms (where conversations are held) are not constructed to a sound transmission class (STC) 45 level, or STC-50 if the room is used for VTC (amplified audio). These standards essentially are reached when loud speech amplified audio can be faintly heard, but cannot be understood in immediate adjacent areas.
(g) U.S. SCI-indoctrinated personnel must t ake appropriate measures to secure non- releasable documents when not used, preferably in an approved security container.
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 28
(h) Computer displays for classified systems must be positioned to afford adequate screening and password protection for screen savers must be applied. Consult with local IAM for further IS security guidance.
(i) Printers connected to U.S.- only systems, faxes, etc., must be located in an area that affords the greatest amount of U.S. controls.
(j ) Inform any co-use agency operating within your SCIF about the presence of the foreign officers, and consider, as appropriate, notifying security officials in adjacent areas outside the SCIF.
(k) Foreign nationals granted access to IS must comply with Reference (n).
(4) C UA with Foreign Governments. A CUA, based on the governing bilateral SCI agreements between the U.S. and appropriate foreign government, is required for DoD SCIFs resident within a foreign government SCIF and for foreign government SCIFs within a DoD SCIF. Accreditation and oversight of such DoD facilities remains with DAC. The following additional guidelines apply:
(a ) Procedures for controlling access (access rosters, badges, access control device codes), hours of access, restrictions on the introduction of prohibited items, protocols for visits, access to U.S.-only areas within the SCIF, destruction of classified waste, and other appropriate SCI security guidelines required to maintain positive control of U.S. SCI information, material, equipment, operations, and sources and methods must be documented in the CUA.
(b) FDO concurrence shall be obtained before finalizing the CUA to meet the provisions of DoDD 5230.20 (Reference (r)) for the country concerned.
(c ) A copy of the CUA will be forwarded via secure channels (e.g., messaging, secure fax, or secure e-mail) to the appropriate HICE or designee.
(d) Physical security guidelines contained in this enclosure must be followed. Careful attention must be given to ensure unencrypted classified communication lines do not transit the area exclusively occupied by the foreign nationals.
(e) The local supporting SSO (through the SSR) will monitor the execution of the CUA and report violations and security concerns to both the FDO and respective CSA and SIO. The CSA will advise the HICE and provide recommended corrective actions as appropriate. The CSA shall report security incidents to the head of the appropriate element of the IC in accordance with Enclosure 5 of Volume 3 of this Manual.
j. IDS. IDSs will comply with basic requirements contained in References (g) and (h) unless otherwise approved by DAC. The following additional guidelines are provided:
DoDM 5105.21-V2, October 19, 2012 Change 2, 11/02/2020 ENCLOSURE 2 29 (1) Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 2050 Standards for USG or Contractor SCIFs. All IDS installed in DIA accredited SCIFs will meet UL 2050 standards, unless otherwise approved. Contractor SCIFs are required to have a UL 2050 certificate. UL 2050 certification is not required for USG SCIFs utilizing USG-managed systems until the monitoring or IDS head is replaced. A copy of the UL certificate must be provided to DAC. USG SCIFs are not required to have a UL certificate if the alarm system was installed by USG alarm technicians. If the alarm system was installed by a contractor, a copy of the UL 2050 certificate is required.
(2) Use of Existing IDS Systems on U.S. Military Installations. IDS located on U.S. military installations and accredited under the previous guidelines (Reference (q), which was superseded by Reference (f)) may continue to be used until a major modification is made.
(3) Line Supervision. Line supervision for all intrusion detection equipment (IDE) components of an IDS (USG and contractor facilities) will employ 128-bit (or greater) encryption whenever the signal line leaves the SCIF. This includes signal lines between any IDE, premise control unit (PCU), and monitoring stations. All lines employing line supervision require certification of the algorithm by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (i.e., a NIST certificate). An alternate form of line supervision may be approved on a case-by-case basis.
(4) Monitoring Stations. Monitoring stations must be continuously supervised and staffed by U.S. personnel. These personnel do not need to be SCI-indoctrinated unless the system was configured to allow them to reset or shunt an alarm condition.
(5) Alarm Response Times. Response time is based upon accreditation and security-in- depth. If the response force cannot meet the required response time, additional security requirements (i.e., additional barriers, adding cameras, going to closed storage) must be added.
k. Government-owned, Contractor -operated (GOCO) SCIFs. The GOCO SCIF will be accredited as a USG facility. The local SIO must ensure that the contractor operating the facility meets the industrial security requirements outlined in Enclosure 3 of Volume 3 of this Manual.
Appendixes 1. SCIF Closeout Guidelines 2. SCIF End of Day Security Check 3. EAPs for SCI Fs within the United States